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Privately financed infrastructure projects: draft chapters of a legislative guide on privately financed infrastructure projects

Report of the Secretary-General

Addendum

I. General legislative and institutional framework

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Legislative recommendations

For host countries wishing to promote privately financed infrastructure projects it is recommended that the following principles be implemented by the law:

Constitutional and legislative framework (paras. 2-14)

Recommendation 1. The legislative and institutional framework for the implementation of privately financed infrastructure projects should ensure transparency, fairness and the long-term sustainability of projects. Undesirable restrictions on private sector participation in infrastructure development and operation should be eliminated.

Scope of authority to award concessions (paras. 15-22)

Recommendation 2. The law should identify the public authorities of the host country (including, as appropriate, national, provincial and local authorities) that are empowered to enter into agreements for the implementation of privately financed infrastructure projects.

Recommendation 3. Privately financed infrastructure projects may include concessions for the construction and operation of new infrastructure facilities and systems or the maintenance, modernization, expansion and operation of existing infrastructure facilities and systems.

Recommendation 4. The law should identify the sectors or types of infrastructure in respect of which concessions may be granted.

Recommendation 5. The law should specify whether a concession might extend to the entire region under the jurisdiction of the respective contracting authority, to a geographical subdivision thereof or to a discrete project, and whether it might be awarded with or without exclusivity, as appropriate, in accordance with rules and principles of law, statutory provisions, regulations and policies applying to the sector concerned. Contracting authorities might be jointly empowered to award concessions beyond a single jurisdiction.

Administrative coordination (paras. 23-29)

Recommendation 6. Institutional mechanisms should be established to coordinate the activities of the public authorities responsible for issuing approvals, licences, permits or authorizations required for the implementation of privately financed infrastructure projects in accordance with statutory or regulatory provisions on the construction and operation of infrastructure facilities of the type concerned.

Authority to regulate infrastructure services (paras. 30-53)

Recommendation 7. The authority to regulate infrastructure services should not be entrusted to entities that directly or indirectly provide infrastructure services.

Recommendation 8. Regulatory competence should be entrusted to functionally independent bodies with a level of autonomy sufficient to ensure that their decisions are taken without political interference or inappropriate pressures from infrastructure operators and public service providers.

Recommendation 9. The rules governing regulatory procedures should be made public. Regulatory decisions should state the reasons on which they are based and should be accessible to interested parties through publication or other means.

Recommendation 10. The law should establish transparent procedures whereby the concessionaire may request a review of regulatory decisions by an independent and impartial body and should set forth the grounds on which a request for review may be based and the availability of court review.

Recommendation 11. Where appropriate, special procedures should be established for handling disputes among public service providers concerning alleged violations of laws and regulations governing the relevant sector.

Notes on the legislative recommendations

A. General remarks

1. The establishment of an appropriate and effective legal framework is a prerequisite to creating an environment that fosters private investment in infrastructure. For countries where such a legal framework already exists, it is important to ensure that the law is sufficiently flexible and responsive to keep pace with the developments in various infrastructure sectors. This chapter deals with some general issues that domestic legislatures are advised to consider when setting up or reviewing the legal framework for privately financed infrastructure projects in order to achieve the above objectives. Section B (paras. 2-14) sets out general considerations on the constitutional and legislative framework; section C (paras. 15-22) deals with the scope of authority to award infrastructure and public services concessions; section D (paras. 23-29) discusses possible measures to enhance administrative coordination; and section E (paras. 30-53) deals with institutional and procedural arrangements for the regulation of infrastructure sectors.

B. Constitutional and legislative framework

2. This section considers general guiding principles that may inspire the legal framework for privately financed infrastructure projects. It further points out the possible implications that the constitutional law of the host country may have for the implementation of these projects. Lastly, this section deals briefly with possible choices to be made regarding the level and type of instrument that might need to be enacted and their scope of application.

1. General guiding principles for a favourable constitutional and legislative framework

3. In considering the establishment of an enabling legal framework or in reviewing the adequacy of the existing framework, domestic legislators may wish to take into account some general principles that have inspired recent legislative actions in various countries, which are discussed briefly in the following paragraphs.

(a) Transparency

4. A transparent legal framework is characterized by clear and readily accessible rules and by efficient procedures for their application. Transparent laws and administrative procedures create predictability, enabling potential investors to estimate the costs and risks of their investment and thus to offer their most advantageous terms. Transparent laws and administrative procedures may also foster openness through provisions requiring the publication of administrative decisions and the disclosure of information of public relevance. They also help to guard against arbitrary or improper actions or decisions by the contracting authority or its officials and thus help to promote confidence in a country's infrastructure development programme. Transparency of laws and administrative procedures is of particular importance where foreign investment is sought, since foreign companies may be unfamiliar with the country's practices for the award of infrastructure projects.

(b) Fairness

5. The legal framework is both the means by which Governments regulate and ensure the provision of public services to their citizens and the means by which public service providers

and their customers may protect their rights. A fair legal framework takes into account the various (and sometimes possibly conflicting) interests of the Government, the public service providers and their customers and seeks to achieve an equitable balance between them. The private sector's business considerations, the users' right to adequate services, both in terms of quality and price, the Government's responsibility for ensuring the continuous provision of essential services and its role in promoting national infrastructure development are but a few of the interests that deserve appropriate recognition in the law.

(c) Long-term sustainability

6. An important objective of domestic legislation on infrastructure development is to ensure the long-term provision of public services, with increasing attention being paid to environmental sustainability. Inadequate arrangements for the operation and maintenance of public infrastructure severely limit efficiency in all sectors of infrastructure and result directly in reduced service quality and increased costs for users. From a legislative perspective, it is important to ensure that the host country has the institutional capacity to undertake the various tasks entrusted to public authorities involved in infrastructure projects throughout their phases of implementation. Another measure to enhance the long-term sustainability of a national infrastructure policy is to achieve a correct balance between competitive and monopolistic provision of public services. Competition may reduce overall costs and provide more back-up facilities for essential services. In certain sectors, competition has also helped to increase the productivity of infrastructure investment, to enhance responsiveness to the needs of the customers and to obtain better quality for public services, thus improving the business environment in all sectors of the economy.

2. Constitutional law and privately financed infrastructure projects

7. The constitutional law of a number of countries refers generally to the duty of the State to ensure the provision of public services. Some of them list the infrastructure and services sectors that come under the responsibility of the State, while in others the task of identifying those sectors is delegated to the legislator. Under some national constitutions, the provision of certain public services is reserved exclusively to the State or to specially created public entities. Other constitutions, however, authorize the State to award concessions to private entities for the development and operation of infrastructure and the provision of public services. In some countries, there are limitations to the participation of foreigners in certain sectors or requirements that the State should participate in the capital of the companies providing public services.

8. For countries wishing to promote private investment in infrastructure it is important to review existing constitutional rules so as to identify possible restrictions to the implementation of privately financed infrastructure projects. In some countries, privately financed infrastructure projects have been delayed by uncertainties regarding the extent of the State's authority to award them. Sometimes, concerns that those projects might contravene constitutional rules on state monopolies or on the provision of public services have led to judicial disputes, with a consequent negative impact on the implementation of the projects.

9. It is further important to take into account constitutional rules relating to the ownership of land or infrastructure facilities. The constitutional law of some countries contains limitations to private ownership of land and certain means of production. In other countries, private property is recognized, but the constitution declares all or certain types of infrastructure to be state property. Prohibitions and restrictions of this nature can be an obstacle to the execution of projects that entail private operation, or private operation and ownership, of the relevant

infrastructure (see further chap. IV, "Construction and operation of infrastructure", paras. 23-29).

3. General and sector-specific legislation

10. Legislation frequently plays a central role in promoting private investment in public infrastructure projects. The law typically embodies a political commitment, provides specific legal rights and may represent an important guarantee of stability of the legal and regulatory regime. In most countries, the implementation of privately financed infrastructure projects was in fact preceded by legislative measures setting forth the general rules under which those projects are awarded and executed.

11. In some countries, as a matter of constitutional law or legislative practice, specific legislation may need to be adopted in respect of individual projects. In other countries with a well-established tradition of awarding concessions to the private sector for the provision of public services, the Government is authorized by general legislation to award to the private sector any activity carried out by the public sector that has an economic value that makes such activity capable of being exploited by private entities. General legislation of this type creates a framework for providing a uniform treatment to issues that are common to privately financed projects in different infrastructure sectors.

12. However, by its very nature, general legislation is normally not suitable to address all the particular requirements of different sectors. Even in countries that have adopted general legislation addressing cross-sectoral issues, it has been found that supplementary sector-specific legislation allows the legislator to formulate rules that take into account the market structure in each sector (see above, "Introduction and background information on privately financed infrastructure projects", paras. 21-46). It should be noted that in many countries sector-specific legislation was adopted at a time when a significant portion, or even the entirety of the national infrastructure constituted state monopolies. For countries interested in promoting private sector investment in infrastructure it is advisable to review existing sector-specific legislation so as to ascertain its suitability for privately financed infrastructure projects.

13. Sector-specific legislation may further play an important role in establishing a framework for the regulation of individual infrastructure sectors (see below, paras. 30-53). Legislative guidance is particularly useful in countries at the initial stages of setting up or developing national regulatory capacities. Such legislation represents a useful assurance that the regulators do not have unlimited discretion in the exercise of their functions, but are bound by the parameters provided by the law. However, it is generally advisable to avoid rigid or excessively detailed legislative provisions dealing with contractual aspects of the implementation of privately financed infrastructure projects, which in most cases would not be adequate to their long-term nature (see further chap. IV, "Construction and operation of infrastructure", and chap. V, "Duration, extension and termination of the project agreement").

14. Many countries have used legislation to establish the general principles for the organization of infrastructure sectors and the basic policy, institutional and regulatory framework. However, the law may not be the best instrument to set detailed technical and financial requirements. Many countries have preferred to enact regulations setting forth more detailed rules to implement the general provisions of domestic laws on privately financed infrastructure projects. Regulations are found to be easier to adapt to a change in environment, whether the change results from the transition to market-based rules or from external

developments, such as new technologies or changing economic or market conditions. Whatever the instrument used, clarity and predictability are of the essence.

C. Scope of authority to award concessions

15. The implementation of privately financed infrastructure projects may require the enactment of special legislation or regulations authorizing the State to entrust the provision of public services to private entities. The enactment of express legislative authorization may be an important measure to foster the confidence of potential investors, national or foreign, in a national policy to promote private sector investment in infrastructure. Central elements to the authority to award concessions for infrastructure projects are discussed in the following paragraphs.

1. Authorized agencies and relevant fields of activity

16. In some legal systems the Government's responsibility for the provision of public services may not be delegated without prior legislative authorization. For those countries which wish to attract private investment in infrastructure, it is particularly important to state clearly in the law the authority to entrust entities other than public authorities of the host country with the right to provide certain public services. Such a general provision may be particularly important in those countries where public services are governmental monopolies or where it is envisaged to engage private entities to provide certain services that used to be available to the public free of charge (see further chap. IV, "Construction and operation of infrastructure", paras. 37 and 38).

17. Where general legislation is adopted, it is also advisable to identify clearly the public authorities or levels of government competent to award infrastructure projects and to act as contracting authorities. In order to avoid unnecessary delay, it is particularly advisable to have rules in place that make it possible to ascertain the persons or offices that have the authority to enter into commitments on behalf of the contracting authority (and, as appropriate, of other public authorities) at different stages of negotiation and to sign the project agreement. It is useful to consider the extent of powers that may be needed by authorities other than the central Government to carry out projects falling within their purview. For projects involving offices or agencies at different levels of government (for example, national, provincial or local), where it is not possible to identify in advance all the relevant offices and agencies involved, other measures may be needed to ensure appropriate coordination among them (see below, paras. 23-29).

18. For purposes of clarity, it is advisable to identify in such general legislation those sectors in which concessions may be awarded. Alternatively, where this is not deemed feasible or desirable, the law might identify those activities which may not be the object of a concession (for example, activities related to national defence or security).

2. Purpose and scope of concessions

19. It may be useful for the law to define the nature and purpose of privately financed infrastructure projects for which concessions may be awarded in the host country. One possible approach may be to define the various categories of projects according to the extent of the rights and obligations assumed by the concessionaire (for example, "build-operate-transfer", "build-own-operate", "built-transfer-operate" and "build- transfer"). However, given the wide variety of schemes that may come into play in connection with private investment in infrastructure, it may be difficult to provide exhaustive definitions of all of them. As an alternative, the law could generally provide that concessions may be awarded for the purpose of entrusting an entity, private or public, with the obligation to carry out infrastructure works and deliver certain public services, in exchange for the right to charge a price for the use of the facility or premises or for the service or goods it generates, or for other payment or remuneration agreed to by the parties. The law could further clarify that concessions may be awarded for the construction and operation of a new infrastructure facility or system or for maintenance, repair, refurbishment, modernization, expansion and operation of existing infrastructure facilities and systems, or only for the management and delivery of a public service.

20. Another important issue concerns the nature of the rights vested in the concessionaire, in particular whether the right to provide the service is exclusive or whether the concessionaire will face the competition from other infrastructure facilities or service providers. Exclusivity may concern the right to provide a service in a particular geographical region (for example, a communal water distribution company) or embrace the whole territory of the country (for example, a national railway company); it may relate to the right to supply one particular type of goods or services to one particular customer (for example, a power generator being the exclusive regional supplier to a power transmitter and distributor) or to a limited group of customers (for example, a national long-distance telephone carrier providing connections to local telephone companies).

21. The decision whether or not to grant exclusivity rights to a certain project or category of projects should be taken in the light of the host country's policy for the sector concerned. As discussed earlier, the scope for competition varies considerably in different infrastructure sectors. While certain sectors, or segments thereof, have the characteristics of natural monopolies, in which case open competition is usually not an economically viable alternative, other infrastructure sectors have been successfully opened to free competition (see "Introduction and background information on privately financed infrastructure projects", paras. 28 and 29).

22. It is desirable therefore to deal with the issue of exclusivity in a flexible manner. Rather than excluding or prescribing exclusive concessions, it may be preferable for the law to authorize the grant of exclusive concessions when it is deemed to be in the public interest, such as in cases where the exclusivity is justified for the purpose of ensuring the technical or economical viability of the project. The contracting authority may be required to state the reasons for envisaging an exclusive concession prior to starting the procedure to select the concessionaire. Such general legislation may be supplemented by sector-specific laws regulating the issue of exclusivity in a manner suitable for each particular sector.

D. Administrative coordination

23. Depending on the administrative structure of the host country, privately financed infrastructure projects may require the involvement of several public authorities, at various levels of government. For instance, the competence to lay down regulations and rules for the activity concerned may rest in whole or in part with a public authority at a level different from the one that is responsible for providing the relevant service. It may also be that both the regulatory and the operational functions are combined in one entity, but that the authority to award government contracts is centralized in a different public authority. For projects involving foreign investment, it may also happen that certain specific competences fall within the mandate of an agency responsible for approving foreign investment proposals.

24. Recent international experience has demonstrated the usefulness of entrusting a central unit within the host country's administration with the overall responsibility for formulating policy and providing practical guidance on privately financed infrastructure projects. Such a central unit may also be responsible for coordinating the input of the main public authorities that interface with the project company. It is recognized, however, that such an arrangement may not be possible in some countries, owing to their particular administrative organization. Where it is not feasible to establish such a central unit, other measures may be considered to ensure an adequate level of coordination among the various public authorities involved, as discussed in the following paragraphs.

1. Coordination of preparatory measures

25. One important measure to ensure the successful implementation of privately financed infrastructure projects is the requirement that the relevant public authority conduct a preliminary assessment of the project's feasibility, including economic and financial aspects such as expected economic advantages of the project, estimated cost and potential revenue anticipated from the operation of the infrastructure facility and the environmental impact of the project. The studies prepared by the contracting authority should, in particular, identify clearly the expected output of the project, provide sufficient justification for the investment, propose a modality for private sector participation and describe a particular solution to the output requirement.

26. Following the identification of the future project, it is for the Government to establish its relative priority and to assign human and other resources for its implementation. At that point, it is desirable that the contracting authority review existing statutory or regulatory requirements relating to the operation of infrastructure facilities of the type proposed with a view to identifying the main public authorities whose input will be required for the implementation of the project. It is also important at this stage to consider the measures that may be required in order for the contracting authority and the other public authorities involved to perform the obligations they may reasonably anticipate in connection with the project. For instance, the Government may need to make advance budgeting arrangements to enable the contracting authority or other public authorities to meet financial commitments that extend over several budgetary cycles, such as long-term commitments to purchase the project's output (see chap. IV, "Construction and operation of infrastructure", paras. 50 and 51). Furthermore, a series of administrative measures may be needed to implement certain forms of support provided to the project, such as tax exemptions and customs facilitation (see chap. II, "Project risks and government support", paras. 51-54), which may require considerable time.

2. Arrangements for facilitating the issuance of licences and permits

27. Legislation may play a useful role in facilitating the issuance of licences and permits that may be needed in the course of a project (such as licences under foreign exchange regulations; licences for the incorporation of the concessionaire; authorizations for the employment of foreigners; registration and stamp duties for the use or ownership of land; import licences for equipment and supplies; construction licences; licences for the installation of cables or pipelines; licences for bringing the facility into operation; and spectrum allocation for mobile communication). The required licences or permits may fall within the competence of various organs at different levels of the administration and the time required for their issuance may be significant, in particular when the approving organs or offices were not originally involved in conceiving the project or negotiating its terms. Delay in bringing an infrastructure project into operation as a result of missing licences or permits for reasons not attributable to the concessionaire is likely to result in an increase in the cost of the project and in the price paid by the users.

28. Thus, it is advisable to conduct an early assessment of licences and permits needed for a particular project in order to avoid delay in the implementation phase. A possible measure to enhance the coordination in the issuance of licences and permits might be to entrust one organ with the authority to receive the applications for licences and permits, to transmit them to the appropriate agencies and to monitor the issuance of all licences and permits listed in the request for proposals and other licences that might be introduced by subsequent regulations. The law may also authorize the relevant agencies to issue provisional licences and permits and provide a time period beyond which those licences and permits are deemed to be granted unless they are rejected in writing.

29. However, it should be noted that the distribution of administrative authority among various levels of government (for example, local, regional and central) often reflects fundamental principles of a country's political organization. Therefore, there are instances where the central Government would not be in a position to assume responsibility for the issuance of all licences and permits or to entrust one single body with such a coordinating function. In those cases, it is important to introduce measures to counter the possibility of delay that might result from such distribution of administrative authority, such as, for instance, agreements between the contracting authority and the other public authorities concerned to facilitate the procedures for a given project or other measures intended to ensure an adequate level of coordination among the various public authorities involved and to make the process of obtaining licences more transparent and efficient. Furthermore, the Government might consider providing some assurance that it will assist the concessionaire as much as possible in obtaining licences required by domestic law, for instance by providing information and assistance to bidders regarding the required licences, as well as the relevant procedures and conditions. From a practical point of view, in addition to coordination among various levels of government and various public authorities, there is a need to ensure consistency in the application of criteria for the issuance of licences and for the transparency of the administrative process.

E. Authority to regulate infrastructure services

30. The provision of certain public services is generally subject to a special regulatory regime that may consist of substantive rules, procedures, instruments and institutions. That framework represents an important instrument to implement the governmental policy for the sector concerned (see "Introduction and background information on privately financed infrastructure projects", paras. 21-46). Depending on the institutional structure of the country concerned and on the allocation of powers between different levels of government, provincial or local

legislation may govern some infrastructure sectors, in full or concurrently with national legislation.

31. Regulation of infrastructure services involves a wide range of general and sector-specific issues, which may vary considerably according to the social, political, legal and economic reality of each host country. While occasionally discussing some of the main regulatory issues that are encountered in a similar context in different sectors (see, for instance, chapter IV, "Construction and operation of infrastructure", paras. 39-46 and 82-95), the *Guide* is not intended to exhaust the legal or policy issues arising out of the regulation of various infrastructure sectors. The term "regulatory agencies" refers to the institutional mechanisms required to implement and monitor the rules governing the activities of infrastructure operators. Because the rules applicable to infrastructure operation often allow for a degree of discretion, a body is required to interpret and apply them, monitor compliance, impose sanctions and settle disputes arising out of the implementation of the rules. The specific regulatory tasks and the amount of discretion they involve will be determined by the rules in question, which can vary widely.

32. The *Guide* assumes that the host country has in place the proper institutional and bureaucratic structures and human resources necessary for the implementation of privately financed infrastructure projects. Nevertheless, as a contribution to domestic legislatures considering the need for, and desirability of, establishing regulatory agencies for monitoring the provision of public services, this section discusses some of the main institutional and procedural issues that may arise in that connection. The discussion contained in this section is illustrative of different options that have been used in domestic legislative measures to set up a regulatory framework for privately financed infrastructure projects, but the *Guide* does not thereby advocate the establishment of any particular model or administrative structure. Practical information and technical advice may be obtained from international financial institutions that carry out programmes to assist their member countries in setting up an adequate regulatory framework (such as the World Bank and the regional development banks).

1. Sectoral competence and mandate of regulatory agencies

33. Regulatory responsibilities may be organized on a sectoral or cross-sectoral basis. Countries that have opted for a sectoral approach have in many cases decided to place closely linked sectors or segments thereof under the same regulatory structure (for example, a common regulatory agency for power and gas or for airports and airlines). Other countries have organized regulation on a cross-sectoral basis, in some cases with one regulatory entity for all infrastructure sectors, and in others with one entity for utilities (water, power, gas, telecommunications) and one for transport. In some countries the competence of regulatory agencies might also extend to several sectors within a given region.

34. Regulatory agencies whose competence is limited to a particular sector usually foster the development of technical, sector-specific expertise. Sector-specific regulation may facilitate the development of rules and practices that are tailored to the needs of the sector concerned. However, the decision between sector-specific and cross-sectoral regulation depends in part on the country's regulatory capacity. Countries with limited expertise and experience in infrastructure regulation may find it preferable to reduce the number of independent structures and try to achieve economies of scale.

35. The law setting up a regulatory mechanism often stipulates a number of general objectives that should guide the actions of regulatory agencies, such as the promotion of competition, the protection of users' interests, the satisfaction of demand, the efficiency of the

sector or the public service providers, their financial viability, the safeguarding of the public interest or of public service obligations and the protection of investors' rights. Having one or two overriding objectives helps clarify the mandate of regulatory agencies and establish priorities among sometimes conflicting objectives. A clear mandate may also increase a regulatory agency's autonomy and credibility.

2. Institutional mechanisms

36. The range of institutional mechanisms for the regulation of infrastructure sectors varies greatly. While there are countries that entrust regulatory functions to organs of the Government (for example, the concerned ministries or departments), other countries have preferred to establish autonomous regulatory agencies, separate from the Government. Some countries have decided to subject certain infrastructure sectors to autonomous and independent regulation while leaving others under ministerial regulation. Sometimes, powers may also be shared between an autonomous regulatory agency and the Government, as is often the case with respect to licensing. From a legislative perspective, it is important to devise institutional arrangements for the regulatory functions that ensure to the regulatory agency an adequate level of efficiency, taking into account the political, legal and administrative tradition of the country.

37. The efficiency of the regulatory regime is in most cases a function of the objectiveness with which regulatory decisions are taken. This, in turn, requires that regulatory agencies should be able to take decisions without interference or inappropriate pressures from infrastructure operators and public service providers. To that effect, legislative provisions in several countries require the independence of the regulatory decision-making process. In order to achieve the desired level of independence it is advisable to separate the regulatory functions from operational ones by removing any regulatory functions that may still be vested with the public service providers and entrust them to a legally and functionally independent entity. Regulatory independence is supplemented by provisions to prevent conflicts of interest, such as prohibitions for staff of the regulatory agency to hold mandates, accept gifts, enter into contracts or have any other relationship (directly or through family members or other intermediaries) with regulated companies, their parents or affiliates.

38. This leads to a related issue, namely the need to minimize the risk of decisions being made or influenced by a body that is also the owner of enterprises operating in the regulated sector or a body acting on political rather than technical grounds. In some countries it was felt necessary to provide the regulatory agency with a certain degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the political organs of government. Independence and autonomy should not be considered solely on the basis of the institutional position of the regulatory function, but also on the basis of its functional autonomy (i.e. the availability of sufficient financial and human resources to discharge their responsibilities adequately).

3. Powers of regulatory agencies

39. Regulatory agencies may have decision-making powers, advisory powers or purely consultative powers or a combination of these different levels of powers depending on the subject matter. In some countries, regulatory agencies were initially given limited powers, which were expanded later as the agencies established a track record of independence and professionalism. The legislation often specifies which powers are vested with the Government and which with a regulatory agency. Clarity in this respect is important to avoid unnecessary conflicts and confusion. Investors, as well as consumers and other interested parties, should know to whom to turn with various requests, applications or complaints.

40. Selection of public service providers, for example, is in many countries a process involving the Government as well as the regulatory agency. If the decision to award a project involves broad judgement of a political rather than technical nature, which may often be the case in the context of infrastructure privatization, final responsibility often rests with the Government. If, however, the award criteria are more technical, as may be the case with a liberal licensing regime for power generation or telecommunications services, many countries entrust the decision to an independent regulatory agency. In other cases, the Government may have to ask the regulatory agency's opinion prior to awarding a concession. On the other hand, some countries exclude direct involvement of regulatory agencies in the award process on the basis that it could affect the way they later regulate the provision of the service concerned.

41. The jurisdiction of regulatory agencies normally extends to all enterprises operating in the sectors they regulate, with no distinction between private and public enterprises. The use of some regulatory powers or instruments may be limited by law to the dominant public service providers in the sector. A regulatory agency may, for example, have price policing powers only vis-à-vis the incumbent or dominant public service provider, while new entrants may be allowed to set prices freely.

42. The matters on which regulatory agencies have to pronounce themselves range from normative responsibilities (for example, rules on the award of concessions and conditions for certification of equipment) to the actual award of concessions; the modification of such instruments; the approval of contracts or decisions proposed by the regulated entities (for example, a schedule or contract on network access); the definition and monitoring of an obligation to provide certain services; the oversight over public service providers (in particular compliance with licence conditions, norms and performance targets); price setting or adjustments; vetting of subsidies, exemptions or other advantages that could distort competition in the sector; sanctions; and dispute settlement.

4. Composition, staff and budget of regulatory agencies

43. When setting up a regulatory agency, a few countries have opted for an agency comprised of a single officer, whereas most others have preferred a regulatory commission. A commission may provide greater safeguards against undue influence or lobbying and may limit the risk of rash regulatory decisions. A one-person regulatory agency, on the other hand, may be able to reach decisions faster and may be held more accountable. To improve the management of the decision-making process in a regulatory commission, the number of members is often kept small (typically three or five members). Even numbers are often avoided to prevent a deadlock, though the chairman could have a casting vote.

44. To increase the regulatory agency's autonomy, different institutions may be involved in the nomination process. In some countries regulatory agencies are appointed by the head of State based on a list submitted by parliament; in others the executive branch of the Government

appoints the regulatory agency but subject to confirmation by parliament or upon nominations submitted by parliament, user associations or other bodies. Minimum professional qualifications are often required of the officials of the regulatory agencies, as well as the absence of conflicts of interest that might disqualify them fromthe function. Terms of office of members of regulatory boards may be staggered in order to prevent total turnover and appointment of all members by the same administration; staggering also promotes continuity in regulatory decision-making. Terms of office are often for a fixed term, may be non-renewable and may be terminated before the expiry of the term for limited reasons only (such as criminal conviction, mental incapacitation, gross negligence or dereliction of duty). Regulatory agencies are often faced with experienced lawyers, accountants and other experts working for the regulated industry and need to be able to acquire the same level of expertise, skills and professionalism, either in-house or by hiring outside advisers as needed.

45. Stable funding sources are critical in order for the regulatory agency to function adequately. In many countries, the budget of the regulatory agency is funded by fees and other levies on the regulated industry. Fees may be set as a percentage of the turnover of the public service providers or be levied for the award of licences, concessions or other authorizations. In some countries, the agency's budget is complemented as needed by budget transfers provided in the annual finance law. However, this may create an element of uncertainty that may reduce the agency's autonomy.

5. Regulatory process and procedures

46. The regulatory framework typically includes procedural rules governing the way the institutions in charge of the various regulatory functions have to exercise their powers. The credibility of the regulatory process requires transparency and objectivity, irrespective of whether regulatory authority is exercised by a government department or minister or by an autonomous regulatory agency. Rules and procedures should be objective and clear so as to ensure fairness, impartiality and timely action by the regulatory agency. For purposes of transparency, the law should require that they be made public. Regulatory decisions should state the reasons on which they are based and should be made accessible to interested parties, through publication or other appropriate means.

47. Transparency may be further enhanced, as required by some laws, by the publication by the regulatory agency of an annual report on the sector, including, for example, the decisions taken during the exercise, the disputes that have arisen and the way they were settled. Such an annual report may also include the accounts of the regulatory agency and an audit thereof by an independent auditor. Legislation in many countries further requires that this annual report be submitted to a committee of parliament.

48. Regulatory decisions may have an impact on the interests of diverse groups, including the concerned public service provider, its current or potential competitors and business or non-business users. In many countries, the regulatory process includes consultation procedures for major decisions or recommendations. In some countries, that consultation takes the form of public hearings, in others of consultation papers on which comments from interested groups are solicited. Some countries have also established consultative bodies comprised of users and other concerned parties and require that their opinion be sought before major decisions and recommendations are made. To enhance transparency, comments, recommendations or opinions resulting from the consultation process may have to be published or made publicly available.

6. Recourse against decisions of the regulatory agency

49. Another important element of the host country's regulatory regime are the mechanisms whereby public service providers may request a review of regulatory decisions. As with the whole regulatory process, a high degree of transparency and credibility is essential. To be credible, the review should be entrusted to an entity that is independent from the regulatory agency taking the original decision, from the political authorities of the host country and from the public service providers.

50. Review of decisions of regulatory agencies is often in the jurisdiction of courts, but in some legal systems recourse against decisions by regulatory agencies is in the exclusive jurisdiction of special tribunals dealing solely with administrative matters, which in some countries are separate from the judicial system. If there are concerns over the review process (for example, as regards possible delays or the capacity of courts to make evaluations of the complexeconomic issues involved in regulatory decisions) review functions may be entrusted to another body, at least in the first instance, before a final recourse to courts or administrative tribunals. In some countries, requests for review are considered by a high-level cross-sectoral independent oversight body. There are also countries where requests for review are heard by a panel composed of persons holding specified judicial and academic functions. As to the grounds on which a request for review may be based, in many cases there are limits, in particular as to the right of the appellate body to substitute its own discretionary assessment of facts for the assessment of the body whose decision is being reviewed.

7. Settlement of disputes between public service providers

51. Disputes may arise between competing concessionaires (for example, two operators of cellular telephony systems) or between concessionaires providing services in different segments of the same infrastructure sector. Such disputes may involve allegations of unfair trade practices (for example, price dumping), uncompetitive practices inconsistent with the country's infrastructure policy (see "Introduction and background information on privately financed infrastructure projects", paras. 23-29) or violation of specific duties of public service providers (see chap. IV, "Construction and operation of infrastructure", paras. 82-93). In many countries, legislative provisions have been found necessary in order to establish an appropriate framework for the settlement of these disputes.

52. Firstly, the various parties may not have contractual arrangements with one another that could provide for an appropriate dispute settlement mechanism. Even where it would be possible to establish a contractual mechanism, the host country may have an interest that disputes involving certain issues (for example, conditions of access to a given infrastructure network) be settled by a specific body in order to ensure consistency in the application of the relevant rules. Furthermore, certain disputes between public service providers may involve issues that, under the laws of the host country, are not considered to be capable of being settled through arbitration.

53. Domestic laws often establish administrative procedures for handling disputes between public service providers. Typically, public service providers may file complaints with the regulatory agency or with another governmental agency responsible for the application of the rules alleged to have been violated (for example, a governmental body in charge of enforcing competition laws and regulations), which in some countries has the authority to issue a binding decision on the matter. Such mechanisms, even where mandatory, do not necessarily preclude resort by the aggrieved persons to courts, although in some legal systems the courts may only have the power to control the legality of the decision (for example, observance of due process) but not its merits.